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Abstract:
Delays at the border for customs clearance are seemingly a central
feature of the trade regime in the CIS states. Here, we argue that with
queuing costs being endogenously determined in such circumstances tariff
liberalization (even in the small economy case) can be welfare worsening
since tariff revenues are replaced by resource using queuing costs. On the
other hand, corruption can be welfare improving if queuing costs are
replaced by resource transferring bribes. We also show how added
distortions between perishable and non-perishable, or between light and
heavy goods can also arise. We show these outcomes using a simple
general equilibrium model, and explore the numerical implications using
Russian data. The orders of magnitude are both significant and opposite in
sign to conventional analyses.
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1.

Introduction
In a number of lower income and transitional economies it is common for there to

be significant delays at the border when achieving customs clearance. This can be due to
complex customs formalities, which sometimes are continually changing, capacity
constraints given limited facilities, and/or corruption at the border. In some African
economies, there are reported delays of 3-6 months to achieve customs clearance2,
although this is perhaps extreme.
Our paper begins with the observation that if such delays are significant and the
length of the delay is endogenously determined, then trade liberalization through tariff
reductions that increases the length of the queue can be welfare worsening. Tariff
reductions, as have occurred in the CIS states, thus appear to be bad policy without first
addressing customs clearance issues. We show this for small open economy cases in a
simple general equilibrium model where there is a physical constraint on the volume of
imports which can be admitted. We then analyse extensions where corruption occurs,
and finally where some imports are perishable. We apply our analysis to data on Russian
trade for the late 1990s, with the results emphasizing the themes that not only is it best to
deal with border and administrative delays first before engaging in trade liberalization,
but also the quantitative orders of magnitudes for the costs involved can be large.
2

See the recent WTO TPRM Report on Togo (1999) p. 30.
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2.

A Model of Trade with Border Delays
The role and significance of border delays for trade liberalization in a number of

economies around the world is reflected in anecdotal evidence on their importance in the
trade of Russia and other former Soviet Union countries. Hare (2001) in a recent piece
on trade policy in CIS transition economies says “It is often asserted that inadequate
physical infrastructure – roads, railways, and the like – inhibits trade, though solid
evidence for this is lacking. More often, the real barrier to trade is again institutional,
taking the form of unreasonable customs delays at many borders in the transition
economy region, accompanied by widespread demands for bribes to expedite the
movement of goods.”
The precise length of these delays and even/or how precisely they arise is
unfortunately poorly documented in the literature but their impact on trade is
unquestionable. There is some suggestion in the literature that continual changes in
customs legislation and uncertainty as to how they are to be implemented is a key factor.
Equally, these delays are also thought to reflect the time taken for negotiations between
officials and importers over valuation, which it is thought can fall dramatically through
the use of negotiation intermediaries. Bribes seem to be involved in this process. These
and other issues in the Russian case are discussed in Beilock (2002), and Wolf and
Gurgen (2000). Delays in the range of weeks or months for clearance are often claimed
in anecdotes, with six weeks being an approximate mean figure suggested to us for
Russia in conversations although this varies substantially with the port of entry and
transportation mode.
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A Simple Model
The purpose of our paper is to focus on the interactions between border delays
and trade liberalization in light of their seeming importance in these cases. We formalize
these interactions in a model of a simple pure exchange economy which is small and a
taker of prices on world markets and engaged in trade. For expositional simplicity of
structure, we assume for now there is no production and all goods are traded (these
features can be changed in numerical application). The world prices for the N goods we
take as given by the π iw . Tariff rates ti apply to imports (ti = 0 for exports), and we
assume the direction of trade is predetermined.3
In this economy, domestic prices depart from world prices on the import side both
due to tariffs and queuing costs at the border Tq(π). For simplicity, we assume these costs
are the same for all goods, and that units for goods are denominated in comparable
physical terms (e.g. tons). Thus, if M goods are imported and (N-M) exported, and the
direction of trade is unchanged,

π id = π iw (1 + ti ) + T q (π ) (i=1………..M).

(1)

Tq is assumed to be indexed and so is homogeneous of degree one in π and is
endogenously determined.
The economy has market demand functions, ξ i (π d , R, Q ) , and non-negative
endowments, wi, for each of the N goods, where πd denotes the N dimensional vector of
domestic commodity prices. R defines tariff revenues, and Q represents endogenously
determined queuing costs (denominated in units of the good being imported). These
3

This is a standard assumption in most theoretical trade models, although numerically the direction of trade
can change when trade policies change. See Abrego, Riezman, and Whalley (2000) for a recent discussion
of the likelihood of this assumption being false in comparisons between free trade, customs unions, and
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demand functions are non-negative, continuous, homogeneous of degree zero in πd and
satisfy Walras Law, i.e., at all price vectors πd

∑ π (ξ (π
N

i =1

d
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i

d

)

)

, R , Q − wi = 0 .

(2)

Assuming there is a single representative consumer in this economy their budget
constraint is given by

∑ π id ξ i (π d , R, Q ) = ∑ π id wi + R − ∑ T q (π )(ξ i − wi ) .
N

N

M

i =1

i =1

i =1

(3)

For simplicity, border delays are assumed to reflect a constraint on the volume of
imports that can be processed over the period of time covered by the model (e.g. one
year). Thus, for now, we consider this to be a physical constraint rather than one
reflecting corruption or other considerations. If C represents the administratively
determined capacity constraint on imports, then

∑ (ξ (π
M

i =1

i

d

)

)

, R, Q − wi ≤ C

where R denotes tariff revenues

(4)

M

M

i =1

i =1

∑ π iwt (ξ i − wi )i , and Q = ∑ T q (π )(ξ i − wi ) denotes the

queuing costs.
In this simple model, if the capacity constraint on imports is binding then queuing
costs Tq(πw) are determined in equilibrium along with domestic prices π d , tariff
revenues, and domestic demands ξ i . The effect of tariff liberalization will be to lower
tariff revenues and increase queuing costs. In the case where tariff rates are uniform
across commodities, tariff reductions simply generate a corresponding increase in
Nash equilibria.

4

queuing costs. Since the latter use real resources, tariff reducing trade liberalization will
typically be welfare worsening.

Model Extensions
This simple model can be extended in a number of ways which capture additional
mechanisms through which border delays and trade liberalization can interact.

Corruption
One is the presence of corruption. This can be modelled simply in this framework
as the ability of customs officials to extract a bribe for allowing passage of goods. We
assume that there is a bound to the bribe, which for simplicity we take to be the ability of
an official to send the importer to the back of the line in the event a bribe is not paid. If
we assume that officials can only do this once, since otherwise they would reveal
themselves as corrupt officials if they repeat the denial of clearance, this means that the
bribe that can be extracted by the official is within epsilon of the queuing costs Tq. For
simplicity, we take the bribe paid to equal Tq, which will now change relative to the no
corruption case.
The discussion above suggests that the queuing costs in the formulation above are
halved, with bribes making up the remaining difference between world and domestic
prices for imports. Thus, if B represents the bribe paid per unit import

π id = π iw (1 + t i ) + T q + B

(5)

and by construction B=Tq.
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This also means that in equation (4) the real resource loss from queuing is halved
and exports increase, since fewer export earnings are needed to cover queuing costs.
Corruption in this case is thus socially desirable since real resource costs are now
partially replaced by a transfer of income to government officials.

Perishability
A further elaboration on the basic model can be used to show how differential
impacts of queuing on different commodities can result. One way this can happen is if
perishable commodities are more adversely affected by queuing than non-perishable
commodities. Differential impacts of border delays across commodities are the end result
with added distortionary costs.
We can capture this by defining a variable γ i which represents the fraction of goods
shipped which actually arrive, where γ i ≤ 1 , and (1 − γ i ) is the perish rate for good i. We
can then make γ i a function of the time spent queuing so as to capture the feature that
perish rates increase with queuing time.
Thus, for each unit shipped and paid for, only γ i units actually arrive; or,

π id =

π iw (1 + t i ) + T q
γi

(6)

and

γ i = 1 − λT

q

(7)

where λ is a constant, and so perish rates increase with queuing time.
With this formulation, differential impacts of queuing by commodity result and
even uniform tariff liberalization now has differential impacts by good.

6

Other Extensions
Various other extensions to this basic model can also be made, which for space
reasons we do not elaborate on in any detail. We can use a model with production rather
than a simple pure exchange economy with endowments. We can also incorporate non
traded as well as traded goods. Both of these are standard in numerical general
equilibrium models of actual economies (see Shoven and Whalley (1992)), although
neither changes the basic analytical structure in which queuing costs are endogenously
determined.
We can also modify the model set out above for cases in which different
commodities incur different queuing costs per unit weight due to differing administrative
procedures. This could arise with valuation procedures being more complex for, say,
components for electronic products compared to basic commodities such as coal. This
can be done by building in different factors of proportionality into the analysis for
queuing costs for the various quantities imported. Again, the essential structure of the
model remains unchanged.

7

3.

Some Calculations Using Russian Data
Using this simple framework, we have made some calculations using Russian data

to explore the possible quantitative orders of magnitude involved with analysis of trade
liberalization that incorporate border delays. The delays reported in the Russian case
appear to be lengthy and a major restraint on trade. These calculations thus serve to
underline the point that if tariff reforms occur with no attention being paid first to
administrative considerations and border delays, liberalization can be welfare worsening
rather than welfare improving as is usually the case in conventional models rather than
providing accurate point estimates of actual impacts. Importantly, they suggest that there
are costs rather than benefits from trade liberalization in such cases and they can be
substantial.
To apply the model set out above to the Russian case, we use CES demand
functions and in addition specify the model so as to also include both a non-traded goods
sector and two traded goods so that distortions between perishable and non perishable
imports can be analysed. All model variants thus include four goods (an exportable, two
importables, and a non traded good).
We use the standard applied general equilibrium modelling approach of calibration
to a base case data set, followed by counter factual equilibrium analysis (see Shoven and
Whalley (1992)). To make our calculations of the impacts of trade liberalization
incorporating border delays we have constructed a benchmark equilibrium data set for
Russian trade, consumption, and endowments (taken to equal production) by averaging
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data for 1997, 1998, and 19994. These are years during which there was substantial
variation in Russian trade performance due to the 1998 financial crisis, and using
averages in this way partially mitigates extremes in any one years data. We use tariff
data from World Bank sources for 19995, which suggests an approximate average tariff
rate across all imports of 10%. We assume an average border delay of 3 weeks in
customs clearance (6 weeks is the figure often claimed). This is the basis for an
approximate estimate that with non-delay shipping times from Western Europe of 3 days
and formal transportation cost in the range of 5% (see Hummels (1999) for a recent
discussion of the size of transportation costs in trade), delay costs could be in the range of
30% of the value of imports. We use this estimate as the base case value in our
computations, making some modifications in the perishability case.
We use calibration methods and this data to determine both share and elasticity
parameters in preferences. For the case of CES preferences, demands are given by
Xi =

αi I

(i=1…..N)

(π ) ∑α (π )
d σ
i

N

j

j =1

d 1−σ
j

(5)

where αi are CES shares, σ is the substitution elasticity, and income, I, is given by
N

M

i =1

i =1

( )(ξ

I = ∑ π id wi − ∑ T q π i

w

i

− wi ) .

(6)

In this case, the import demand elasticity, ηim , for import good i is given by

η im = (− σ − S i (1 − σ ))

Xi
( X i − Wi )

( i=1…..N)

4

(7)

Data on trade and consumption are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators. Data on
production by industry (which we use to represent endowments) originates from Goskomstat sources and
we are thankful to Natalia Tourdyeva for providing it for us.
5
Data on tariff rates are taken from the 2001 World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank.
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where Si is the income expenditure share on good i.
These elasticities are not constant and so direct calibration is not possible. The
convention in calibration literature is to use a literature estimate and choose σ so that the
implied point estimate of the elasticity in the neighbourhood of the benchmark
equilibrium is literature consistent. If share parameters on imported goods are large, then
negative values of σ can result from calibration if import demand elasticities in the
neighbourhood of one are used. This is common in general equilibrium trade models,
since the majority of estimates in the literature are around one (see Erkel-Rousse and
Mirza (2002)). Not recognizing the significance of non traded goods can result in this
problem since expenditure shares on traded goods are smaller in models with non traded
goods than without them, and is one reason for including them in the model.
Using GAMS(1996) solution software, we calibrate both the basic model and
associated variants to the averaged 1997-1999 benchmark data set. We then evaluate the
effects of tariff reform for each model variant by computing counterfactual equilibria
which we also compare to the base case. We also use a model variant where no border
delays are present, which we term the conventional case. In this event, gains from tariff
liberalization occur.
We classify the trade data into importables and exportables based on the sign of net
trade flows by commodity. We use equation (5) to calibrate model share parameters from
data on consumption and prices, choosing units for goods in the model such that world
prices are one. Equation (5) is used jointly in calibration with equation (6) which
determines σ given shares, once import price elasticity values are assumed.6 Our
6

We calibrate to the import price elasticity of the first import good, and since share parameters on the two
imports are similar these two import price elasticities are very close.
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calibrations yield share and elasticity parameter estimates for the basic model variants for
assumed values of import price elasticities lying between –1 and –2 (one is the most
frequently used in empirical trade models) as set out in Table 1.
Using models parameterized in this way, we have generated two sets of results
which allow us to analyse the interactions between trade liberalization and border delays.
In Table 2, we show welfare and trade impacts of liberalization in the basic model with
border delays and in two model extensions which incorporate corruption and
perishability. These estimates are reported for the three values of assumed import price
elasticities used in calibration in Table 1.

Table 1
Calibrated Basic Model Parameters From 1997-1999 Russian Data
Assumed
Import Price
Elasticity
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0

σ
Generated by
Calibration
0.314
0.676
1.038

Share Parameters in Preferences
imported goods
exportables
non-traded goods
0.260
0.276
0.293

0.220
0.234
0.248

0.068
0.064
0.060

0.452
0.426
0.399

Results in Table 2 show negative welfare effects of trade liberalization measured in
terms of the Hicksian equivalent variation as a percentage of income in all cases. These
costs become larger as the assumed price elasticity rises since as both substitution
elasticities and share parameters change the evaluation of utility pre and post
liberalization changes. Larger impacts on queuing costs across these cases reflect the
different share parameters generated by calibration. Costs are smaller in the with
corruption cases, for high elasticities and larger for smaller elasticities. The real resource
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costs from queuing in corruption cases are approximately one half of those in no
corruption cases, and in that sense corruption is good in the model. But changes in
queuing costs are comparable. Perishability raises costs slightly for all import price
elasticity cases. Import volumes only change in the perishability cases.

Table 2
Impacts of Trade Liberalization in Russia in the Presence
of Border Delays; models calibrated to averaged 1997-1999 data

A. Import Price Elasticity = -1
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian
EV as % of income
• Impacts on import volumes
(%change)
• Impacts on export volumes
(%change)
B. Import Price Elasticity = -1.5
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian
EV as % of income
• Impacts on import volumes
(%change)
• Impacts on export volumes
(%change)
C. Import Price Elasticity = -2
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian
EV as % of income
• Impacts on import volumes
(%change)
• Impacts on export volumes
(%change)

Basic
Model with
border
delays

Extended
Model with
corruption

Extended Model with
perishability

-0.130

-0.146

-0.134

0

0

0.711

0.920

-0.078(perishable)
0.017(non perishable)
0.723

-0.248

-0.245

-0.253

0

0

1.361

1.550

-0.431(perishable)
0.095(non perishable)
1.369

-0.343

-0.310

-0.347

0

0

1.887

1.969

-0.989(perishable)
0.217(non perishable)
1.883
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The second set of results in Table 3 compares those from the basic model with
border delays to those from a more conventional model with no border delays. To make
this comparison, we use a case for a conventional tariff model where there are no queuing
costs in the base case, so that in this model relative price effects of tariff liberalization
come into play as tariffs are eliminated and no queuing costs enter. In the comparable
border delay model, the capacity constraint on imports remains. A tariff equal to the
combined queuing plus tariff wedge in the base model is applied to the conventional
model. We then consider a reduction in this tariff by 10 percentage points. In both of
these cases, we use an import price elasticity of minus one in calibration. As Table 3
indicates, the signs of welfare effects are reversed between models, and the absolute
values of effects are different.
Table 3
Comparing result of trade liberalization in Russia using a conventional model
and one incorporating border delays, averaged 1997-1999 data
Conventional Model
(No border delays)

Basic Model with
border delays

0.044

-0.130

0.931

0

0.614

0.711

Import Price Elasticity = -1
• Welfare gain/loss as Hicksian
EV as % of income
• Impacts on import volumes
(%change)
• Impacts on export volumes
(%change)

These simulation results thus clearly show how trade liberalization can be welfare
worsening in the presence of border delays. Tariff reductions have little or no impact on
domestic prices because of the capacity constraint on processing imports. More queuing
results in added real resource costs, rather than generating revenues as is true with tariffs.
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The presence of corruption tends to weaken these effects since lowered tariffs now
increase transfers to corrupt officials with smaller effects on aggregate incomes.
Perishability considerations affect the costs of liberalization through more product loss,
and added queuing results. And the differences relative to a conventional trade
liberalization model are in sign.
In sum, this analysis and the simulations reported point to the significant role that
border delays can play in influencing the effects of trade liberalization. Without prior
attention to administrative procedures and customs clearance, trade liberalization can
become welfare worsening by increasing queuing costs. Trade liberalization in CIS states
that does not first deal with administrative delays can thus be viewed as potentially
counterproductive.
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